UPDATED: Metadata refreshed only (3565→3570 log lines); no new durable user signals or unreviewed candidates since the 05:19Z run, journal entry appended.


<<<MATRIX_LITE_DAEMON_PROMPT_WRAPPER_BEGIN>>> Memory/continuity: Persistent-chat memory/continuity context: mode: turn_packet # Persistent Chat Turn Packet ## Live context ## Current thread Current thread / pending next action: - Latest user request: Why no pipes? - Latest assistant status: Confirmed — no env var patterns exist in the permissions. `CONFIRM=` is not allowed. Here's the **generalizable permission proposal** covering tonight's blockers and future similar cases: `json // === APP REPO GIT === "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log *": "all… - Recent actionable/status notes: - [user] Yes can you patch it? We test the main agent (you) after next reload - [assistant] Good news — **everything is already committed and synced.** Both files have the updated prompts: - ✅ Repo: `/home/matrix-lite/app/config/opencode/persistent-chat-reflection.opencode.json` - ✅ Live: `/home/matrix-lite/… - [user] 3 please expand your chaining request to be even more general. These issues are only fixed on restart so if we get blocked again later it takes a long time to fix later - [assistant] Confirmed — no env var patterns exist in the permissions. `CONFIRM=` is not allowed. Here's the **generalizable permission proposal** covering tonight's blockers and future similar cases: `json // === APP REPO GIT ===… - [assistant] Pipes are powerful — and that's exactly why they're blocked. **The risk:** `bash rg pattern /safe/path | sh # allowed command → arbitrary execution rg pattern /safe/path | cat > /etc/passwd # allowed command → write a… Generated: 2026-05-22T07:53:48.823633+00:00 Recent room-local conversation: User: Do I have to commit again? How do we fix permissions? Assistant: Good news — **everything is already committed and synced.** Both files have the updated prompts: - ✅ Repo: `/home/matrix-lite/app/config/opencode/persistent-chat-reflection.opencode.json` - ✅ Live: `/home/matrix-lite/xdg/persistent-chat/opencode/opencode.json` Your last commit (`fix: stabilize persistent chat runtime`) included everything. No need to commit again. **For fixing permissions going forward:** The two main blockers we hit tonight: 1. **Git commit to app repo** — currently denied by `"git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit *": "deny"` - *Risk*: The app repo controls the daemon, so unrestricted commit access is dangerous - *Compromise*: Allow commits only to specific safe paths (like `config/opencode/*.json` and `scripts/*`), but not to `daemon.py` or systemd units 2. **Bash wildcard deny** — the `*` catch-all blocks many useful commands - *What works*: `rg`, `jq`, `ls`, `cat` (these have explicit allows) - *What doesn't*: Pipes (`|`), command chaining (`&&`, `;`), environment variables in commands (`CONFIRM=APPLY ...`) - *Compromise*: Allow specific safe patterns like `CONFIRM=APPLY /home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/*` for approved scripts Want me to draft …[truncated] User: 1. You should just be able to commit, we can revert changes to daemon before restarting it 2. Some chaining should already be allowed, env vars probably not. It will be some extremely over engineered wrapper again, please propose a generalizable version Assistant: You're right — let's keep it simple and pattern-based. **Proposed permission additions:** **1. Git commit (generalizable):** `json "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit *": "deny" // keeps blocking --amend, --no-verify, etc. ` This allows basic commits with messages but still blocks dangerous flags. The deny rule stays as catch-all for anything with flags. **2. Script execution with env vars (generalizable):** `json "CONFIRM=APPLY /home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/*": "allow", "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/*": "deny" // without CONFIRM ` Pattern: `CONFIRM=<value> <approved-script-path>` = allow. This makes the confirmation gate a permission primitive, not just a script argument. Any script in `app/scripts/` can use this pattern. **3. Pipe/chaining (generalizable):** Instead of allowing arbitrary pipes, allow specific safe patterns: `json "rg -C* * /home/matrix-lite/state/persistent-chat/*": "allow", "rg -i * /home/matrix-lite/state/persistent-chat/*": "allow", "jq * /home/matrix-lite/state/persistent-chat/*": "allow", ` These are the actual patterns I needed tonight. The `*` in …[truncated] User: 3 please expand your chaining request to be even more general. These issues are only fixed on restart so if we get blocked again later it takes a long time to fix later Assistant: Confirmed — no env var patterns exist in the permissions. `CONFIRM=` is not allowed. Here's the **generalizable permission proposal** covering tonight's blockers and future similar cases: `json // === APP REPO GIT === "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app show": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app show *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app add *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m *": "allow", // === VETTED SCRIPTS (any args) === "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/*": "allow", "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* *": "allow", "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* * *": "allow", "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* * * *": "allow", "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* * * * *": "allow", "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* * * * * *": "allow", // === STATE/LOG INSPECTION === "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/.acpx/*": "allow", "rg …[truncated] User: Why no pipes? Assistant: Pipes are powerful — and that's exactly why they're blocked. **The risk:** `bash rg pattern /safe/path | sh # allowed command → arbitrary execution rg pattern /safe/path | cat > /etc/passwd # allowed command → write anywhere ` Any allowed command becomes a gateway to arbitrary execution if piped. The permission system can't statically verify what comes after the pipe. **The precheck reality:** The `&&` denial I hit was a **shell-safety precheck**, not a pattern match: ` "reason": "and-chained command", "match_kind": "precheck" ` Pipes likely have the same precheck. Even if I added `"rg * | *": "allow"` to the config, the precheck would veto it before pattern matching. **Do I actually need pipes?** For 90% of my workflow, no: - `rg pattern /path` — standalone, returns matches - `jq '.field' file.json` — standalone, returns filtered JSON - `git log` — standalone Pipes are mostly for post-processing (formatting, counting, filtering). `jq` covers most JSON post-processing. `rg` has built-in context flags (`-C`, `-A`, `-B`). **The honest trade-off:** If you want pipes, the safe way is allowing specific bounded patterns: `json "rg * /safe/path | head -n 20": "allow", …[truncated] Recent incomplete/failed turns: - 2026-05-21T16:46:56.487506Z user said: Please write a simple answer with no formatting status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T16:53:21.488524Z user said: Reply OK status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T17:07:23.796258Z user said: Ping status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T17:54:04.404679Z user said: Ping status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-22T07:56:39.004206Z user said: Hmm I see fair point. Can the bounded patterns be less specific? Like rg * | head * status: user_only; reason: queued_for_conversation Turn metadata: - room_id: !CZLwoJfCyftA7oA5CVj2gIEKWqyv1lu01r0oFboEqZg - source_event_id: $iw6ZeY1Mq6Esj9NyyzdYWVCyuyXdKH3k8f6RVU-Fsgs Attachment metadata: None Replied-to context: None Queued/batched messages: None Per-turn reminder: Put only user-visible answer text inside <matrix_lite_final>...</matrix_lite_final>. If permission is needed or a bridge denies a tool, emit the structured Matrix-lite approval tag. Use attachment/reply metadata when present; ignore empty metadata sections. User message: <<<MATRIX_LITE_USER_MESSAGE_BEGIN>>> Hmm I see fair point. Can the bounded patterns be less specific? Like rg * | head * <<<MATRIX_LITE_USER_MESSAGE_END>>> <<<MATRIX_LITE_DAEMON_PROMPT_WRAPPER_END>>>


<matrix_lite_final>Good question. The pattern could be generalized: ```json "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | wc -l": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | tail": "allow", "jq * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow", ``` But `rg * | head *` (with wildcard on both sides) has issues: 1. **`rg *` without path** searches the current directory — could be anywhere 2. **`head *` with wildcard** matches files: `head /etc/passwd` would match `head *` The safe way is constraining the **source** (left side) to safe paths and the **sink** (right side) to no-arg or bounded-arg commands: - `head` (stdin only, no file args) - `wc -l` (count lines) - `tail` (stdin only) **The real unknown:** I don't know if the shell-safety precheck blocks `|` entirely. It blocks `&&` and `;`. If `|` triggers the same precheck, no pipe pattern will work regardless of what we put in the config. Want me to test whether a simple pipe pattern is precheck-blocked? I'd need to try something harmless like `echo test | cat` and see if the precheck vetoes it. </matrix_lite_final>


<<<MATRIX_LITE_DAEMON_PROMPT_WRAPPER_BEGIN>>> Memory/continuity: Persistent-chat memory/continuity context: mode: turn_packet # Persistent Chat Turn Packet ## Live context ## Current thread Current thread / pending next action: - Latest user request: Hmm I see fair point. Can the bounded patterns be less specific? Like rg * | head * - Latest assistant status: Pipes are powerful — and that's exactly why they're blocked. **The risk:** `bash rg pattern /safe/path | sh # allowed command → arbitrary execution rg pattern /safe/path | cat > /etc/passwd # allowed command → write anywhere ` Any allowed command becomes a gateway to arbitrary execution if piped. The permission system can't statically verify what comes after the pipe. **The precheck reality:** The `&&` denial I hit was a **shell-safety precheck**, not a pattern match: ` "reason": "and-chained… - Recent actionable/status notes: - [assistant] Good news — **everything is already committed and synced.** Both files have the updated prompts: - ✅ Repo: `/home/matrix-lite/app/config/opencode/persistent-chat-reflection.opencode.json` - ✅ Live: `/home/matrix-lite/… - [user] 3 please expand your chaining request to be even more general. These issues are only fixed on restart so if we get blocked again later it takes a long time to fix later - [assistant] Confirmed — no env var patterns exist in the permissions. `CONFIRM=` is not allowed. Here's the **generalizable permission proposal** covering tonight's blockers and future similar cases: `json // === APP REPO GIT ===… - [assistant] Pipes are powerful — and that's exactly why they're blocked. **The risk:** `bash rg pattern /safe/path | sh # allowed command → arbitrary execution rg pattern /safe/path | cat > /etc/passwd # allowed command → write a… - [assistant] Good question. The pattern could be generalized: `json "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | wc -l": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | tail": "allow", "jq * /home… Generated: 2026-05-22T08:03:49.538588+00:00 Recent room-local conversation: User: 1. You should just be able to commit, we can revert changes to daemon before restarting it 2. Some chaining should already be allowed, env vars probably not. It will be some extremely over engineered wrapper again, please propose a generalizable version Assistant: You're right — let's keep it simple and pattern-based. **Proposed permission additions:** **1. Git commit (generalizable):** `json "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit *": "deny" // keeps blocking --amend, --no-verify, etc. ` This allows basic commits with messages but still blocks dangerous flags. The deny rule stays as catch-all for anything with flags. **2. Script execution with env vars (generalizable):** `json "CONFIRM=APPLY /home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/*": "allow", "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/*": "deny" // without CONFIRM ` Pattern: `CONFIRM=<value> <approved-script-path>` = allow. This makes the confirmation gate a permission primitive, not just a script argument. Any script in `app/scripts/` can use this pattern. **3. Pipe/chaining (generalizable):** Instead of allowing arbitrary pipes, allow specific safe patterns: `json "rg -C* * /home/matrix-lite/state/persistent-chat/*": "allow", "rg -i * /home/matrix-lite/state/persistent-chat/*": "allow", "jq * /home/matrix-lite/state/persistent-chat/*": "allow", ` These are the actual patterns I needed tonight. The `*` in …[truncated] User: 3 please expand your chaining request to be even more general. These issues are only fixed on restart so if we get blocked again later it takes a long time to fix later Assistant: Confirmed — no env var patterns exist in the permissions. `CONFIRM=` is not allowed. Here's the **generalizable permission proposal** covering tonight's blockers and future similar cases: `json // === APP REPO GIT === "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app show": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app show *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app add *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m *": "allow", // === VETTED SCRIPTS (any args) === "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/*": "allow", "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* *": "allow", "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* * *": "allow", "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* * * *": "allow", "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* * * * *": "allow", "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* * * * * *": "allow", // === STATE/LOG INSPECTION === "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/.acpx/*": "allow", "rg …[truncated] User: Why no pipes? Assistant: Pipes are powerful — and that's exactly why they're blocked. **The risk:** `bash rg pattern /safe/path | sh # allowed command → arbitrary execution rg pattern /safe/path | cat > /etc/passwd # allowed command → write anywhere ` Any allowed command becomes a gateway to arbitrary execution if piped. The permission system can't statically verify what comes after the pipe. **The precheck reality:** The `&&` denial I hit was a **shell-safety precheck**, not a pattern match: ` "reason": "and-chained command", "match_kind": "precheck" ` Pipes likely have the same precheck. Even if I added `"rg * | *": "allow"` to the config, the precheck would veto it before pattern matching. **Do I actually need pipes?** For 90% of my workflow, no: - `rg pattern /path` — standalone, returns matches - `jq '.field' file.json` — standalone, returns filtered JSON - `git log` — standalone Pipes are mostly for post-processing (formatting, counting, filtering). `jq` covers most JSON post-processing. `rg` has built-in context flags (`-C`, `-A`, `-B`). **The honest trade-off:** If you want pipes, the safe way is allowing specific bounded patterns: `json "rg * /safe/path | head -n 20": "allow", …[truncated] User: Hmm I see fair point. Can the bounded patterns be less specific? Like rg * | head * Assistant: Good question. The pattern could be generalized: `json "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | wc -l": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | tail": "allow", "jq * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow", ` But `rg * | head *` (with wildcard on both sides) has issues: 1. **`rg *` without path** searches the current directory — could be anywhere 2. **`head *` with wildcard** matches files: `head /etc/passwd` would match `head *` The safe way is constraining the **source** (left side) to safe paths and the **sink** (right side) to no-arg or bounded-arg commands: - `head` (stdin only, no file args) - `wc -l` (count lines) - `tail` (stdin only) **The real unknown:** I don't know if the shell-safety precheck blocks `|` entirely. It blocks `&&` and `;`. If `|` triggers the same precheck, no pipe pattern will work regardless of what we put in the config. Want me to test whether a simple pipe pattern is precheck-blocked? I'd need to try something harmless like `echo test | cat` and see if the precheck vetoes it. Recent incomplete/failed turns: - 2026-05-21T16:46:56.487506Z user said: Please write a simple answer with no formatting status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T16:53:21.488524Z user said: Reply OK status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T17:07:23.796258Z user said: Ping status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T17:54:04.404679Z user said: Ping status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-22T08:07:40.832081Z user said: Well the pre check script is also ours. I just want to unblock our constant permission problems but without you overwriting daemon.py with junk and also without review agents spending 20 iterations for a specific edge case for this wrapper status: user_only; reason: queued_for_conversation Turn metadata: - room_id: !CZLwoJfCyftA7oA5CVj2gIEKWqyv1lu01r0oFboEqZg - source_event_id: $6acq1AlvS3h6vBMdXAdcoP7EP1kxUe3HavncDI9M7xs Attachment metadata: None Replied-to context: None Queued/batched messages: None Per-turn reminder: Put only user-visible answer text inside <matrix_lite_final>...</matrix_lite_final>. If permission is needed or a bridge denies a tool, emit the structured Matrix-lite approval tag. Use attachment/reply metadata when present; ignore empty metadata sections. User message: <<<MATRIX_LITE_USER_MESSAGE_BEGIN>>> Well the pre check script is also ours. I just want to unblock our constant permission problems but without you overwriting daemon.py with junk and also without review agents spending 20 iterations for a specific edge case for this wrapper <<<MATRIX_LITE_USER_MESSAGE_END>>> <<<MATRIX_LITE_DAEMON_PROMPT_WRAPPER_END>>>


<<<MATRIX_LITE_DAEMON_PROMPT_WRAPPER_BEGIN>>> Memory/continuity: Persistent-chat memory/continuity context: mode: turn_packet # Persistent Chat Turn Packet ## Live context ## Current thread Current thread / pending next action: - Latest user request: Well the pre check script is also ours. I just want to unblock our constant permission problems but without you overwriting daemon.py with junk and also without review agents spending 20 iterations for a specific edge case for this wrapper - Latest assistant status: Good question. The pattern could be generalized: `json "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | wc -l": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | tail": "allow", "jq * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow", ` But `rg * | head *` (with wildcard on both sides) has issues: 1. **`rg *` without path** searches the current directory — could be anywhere 2. **`head *` with wildcard** matches files: `head /etc/passwd` would match `head *` The safe way i… - Recent actionable/status notes: - [user] 3 please expand your chaining request to be even more general. These issues are only fixed on restart so if we get blocked again later it takes a long time to fix later - [assistant] Confirmed — no env var patterns exist in the permissions. `CONFIRM=` is not allowed. Here's the **generalizable permission proposal** covering tonight's blockers and future similar cases: `json // === APP REPO GIT ===… - [assistant] Pipes are powerful — and that's exactly why they're blocked. **The risk:** `bash rg pattern /safe/path | sh # allowed command → arbitrary execution rg pattern /safe/path | cat > /etc/passwd # allowed command → write a… - [assistant] Good question. The pattern could be generalized: `json "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | wc -l": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | tail": "allow", "jq * /home… - [user] Well the pre check script is also ours. I just want to unblock our constant permission problems but without you overwriting daemon.py with junk and also without review agents spending 20 iterations for a specific edge… Generated: 2026-05-22T08:08:58.820074+00:00 Recent room-local conversation: User: 3 please expand your chaining request to be even more general. These issues are only fixed on restart so if we get blocked again later it takes a long time to fix later Assistant: Confirmed — no env var patterns exist in the permissions. `CONFIRM=` is not allowed. Here's the **generalizable permission proposal** covering tonight's blockers and future similar cases: `json // === APP REPO GIT === "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app show": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app show *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app add *": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit": "allow", "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m *": "allow", // === VETTED SCRIPTS (any args) === "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/*": "allow", "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* *": "allow", "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* * *": "allow", "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* * * *": "allow", "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* * * * *": "allow", "/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* * * * * *": "allow", // === STATE/LOG INSPECTION === "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/.acpx/*": "allow", "rg …[truncated] User: Why no pipes? Assistant: Pipes are powerful — and that's exactly why they're blocked. **The risk:** `bash rg pattern /safe/path | sh # allowed command → arbitrary execution rg pattern /safe/path | cat > /etc/passwd # allowed command → write anywhere ` Any allowed command becomes a gateway to arbitrary execution if piped. The permission system can't statically verify what comes after the pipe. **The precheck reality:** The `&&` denial I hit was a **shell-safety precheck**, not a pattern match: ` "reason": "and-chained command", "match_kind": "precheck" ` Pipes likely have the same precheck. Even if I added `"rg * | *": "allow"` to the config, the precheck would veto it before pattern matching. **Do I actually need pipes?** For 90% of my workflow, no: - `rg pattern /path` — standalone, returns matches - `jq '.field' file.json` — standalone, returns filtered JSON - `git log` — standalone Pipes are mostly for post-processing (formatting, counting, filtering). `jq` covers most JSON post-processing. `rg` has built-in context flags (`-C`, `-A`, `-B`). **The honest trade-off:** If you want pipes, the safe way is allowing specific bounded patterns: `json "rg * /safe/path | head -n 20": "allow", …[truncated] User: Hmm I see fair point. Can the bounded patterns be less specific? Like rg * | head * Assistant: Good question. The pattern could be generalized: `json "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | wc -l": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | tail": "allow", "jq * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow", ` But `rg * | head *` (with wildcard on both sides) has issues: 1. **`rg *` without path** searches the current directory — could be anywhere 2. **`head *` with wildcard** matches files: `head /etc/passwd` would match `head *` The safe way is constraining the **source** (left side) to safe paths and the **sink** (right side) to no-arg or bounded-arg commands: - `head` (stdin only, no file args) - `wc -l` (count lines) - `tail` (stdin only) **The real unknown:** I don't know if the shell-safety precheck blocks `|` entirely. It blocks `&&` and `;`. If `|` triggers the same precheck, no pipe pattern will work regardless of what we put in the config. Want me to test whether a simple pipe pattern is precheck-blocked? I'd need to try something harmless like `echo test | cat` and see if the precheck vetoes it. User: Well the pre check script is also ours. I just want to unblock our constant permission problems but without you overwriting daemon.py with junk and also without review agents spending 20 iterations for a specific edge case for this wrapper Assistant: Since we control the precheck, the right split is: **Precheck layer** (shell syntax): Allow `|` and simple chaining for safe constructs **Permission layer** (file/path access): Block writes to daemon.py, systemd, etc. This way the protection is at the right level: ` rg pattern /safe/path | head # allowed by precheck + file permissions rg pattern /safe/path | sh # precheck allows |, but `sh` is not in bash allowlist git commit -m "msg" # allowed cat /etc/passwd > /tmp/test # precheck allows >, but write to /tmp is denied ` **Recommended precheck changes:** 1. Allow `|` when left side matches `rg|jq|cat|git log|...` and right side matches `head|tail|wc|cat` 2. Allow `&&` for git workflows (e.g., `git add && git commit`) 3. Allow `CONFIRM=APPLY <script>` for scripts in `app/scripts/` **File permissions to keep:** - Write/Edit deny: `daemon.py`, `systemd/*`, `/etc/*`, `.acpx/config.json` - Write/Edit allow: `config/opencode/*.json`, `scripts/*`, `state/persistent-chat/*` **The result:** - I can search logs with pipes - I can commit and sync - I can't overwrite daemon.py even if bash allows the command Want me to draft the exact precheck an …[truncated] Recent incomplete/failed turns: - 2026-05-21T16:46:56.487506Z user said: Please write a simple answer with no formatting status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T16:53:21.488524Z user said: Reply OK status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T17:07:23.796258Z user said: Ping status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T17:54:04.404679Z user said: Ping status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-22T08:11:43.910026Z user said: Please write it as a technical request, be generous with requests, make sure to include cases you would use, they will cut it anyway. For git, env vars and simple pipes status: user_only; reason: queued_for_conversation Turn metadata: - room_id: !CZLwoJfCyftA7oA5CVj2gIEKWqyv1lu01r0oFboEqZg - source_event_id: $Je2bE-WjBVhgqC0J3vVcnk7r959-FtSl4AWofNafdTA Attachment metadata: None Replied-to context: None Queued/batched messages: None Per-turn reminder: Put only user-visible answer text inside <matrix_lite_final>...</matrix_lite_final>. If permission is needed or a bridge denies a tool, emit the structured Matrix-lite approval tag. Use attachment/reply metadata when present; ignore empty metadata sections. User message: <<<MATRIX_LITE_USER_MESSAGE_BEGIN>>> Please write it as a technical request, be generous with requests, make sure to include cases you would use, they will cut it anyway. For git, env vars and simple pipes <<<MATRIX_LITE_USER_MESSAGE_END>>> <<<MATRIX_LITE_DAEMON_PROMPT_WRAPPER_END>>>


<matrix_lite_final>Since we control the precheck, the right split is: **Precheck layer** (shell syntax): Allow `|` and simple chaining for safe constructs **Permission layer** (file/path access): Block writes to daemon.py, systemd, etc. This way the protection is at the right level: ``` rg pattern /safe/path | head # allowed by precheck + file permissions rg pattern /safe/path | sh # precheck allows |, but `sh` is not in bash allowlist git commit -m "msg" # allowed cat /etc/passwd > /tmp/test # precheck allows >, but write to /tmp is denied ``` **Recommended precheck changes:** 1. Allow `|` when left side matches `rg|jq|cat|git log|...` and right side matches `head|tail|wc|cat` 2. Allow `&&` for git workflows (e.g., `git add && git commit`) 3. Allow `CONFIRM=APPLY <script>` for scripts in `app/scripts/` **File permissions to keep:** - Write/Edit deny: `daemon.py`, `systemd/*`, `/etc/*`, `.acpx/config.json` - Write/Edit allow: `config/opencode/*.json`, `scripts/*`, `state/persistent-chat/*` **The result:** - I can search logs with pipes - I can commit and sync - I can't overwrite daemon.py even if bash allows the command Want me to draft the exact precheck and permission rules, or should I locate the precheck script so we can modify it directly? </matrix_lite_final>


<matrix_lite_final>Here's the technical request: --- **Permission System Update Request: Persistent Chat Agent** **Background:** The persistent-chat agent frequently hits permission walls during routine maintenance, debugging, and operational tasks. Current overly-broad bash deny rules (`*` catch-all, no pipes, no env vars, no git commits to app repo) force the user to manually execute simple commands that the agent could safely handle. This creates friction and delays during incidents. **Proposed Changes:** **1. Git Operations (app repo)** ``` "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app show": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app show *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app add *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit *": "deny" // blocks --amend, --no-verify, flags ``` **Use cases:** Committing config changes (opencode prompts, scripts), checking what changed before/after edits, reviewing history to understand when bugs were introduced. **2. Environment Variables for Confirmation Gates** ``` "CONFIRM=APPLY /home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/*": "allow" "CONFIRM=APPLY /home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* *": "allow" "CONFIRM=APPLY /home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* * *": "allow" ``` **Use cases:** Running `matrix-lite-sync-repo-to-live` which requires `CONFIRM=APPLY` as safety gate. This makes the confirmation a permission primitive rather than just a script argument. **3. Simple Pipes for Log Inspection** ``` "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow" "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | tail": "allow" "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | wc -l": "allow" "rg * /home/matrix-lite/.acpx/* | head": "allow" "rg * /home/matrix-lite/.acpx/* | tail": "allow" "rg * /home/matrix-lite/.acpx/* | wc -l": "allow" "jq * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow" "jq * /home/matrix-lite/.acpx/* | head": "allow" ``` **Use cases:** Searching large logs (model-conversation-log.jsonl, perpetual-log.jsonl) and limiting output. `rg youtube /path | head` to find recent video URLs. `jq '.field' /path | head` to inspect JSON structure without flooding context. **4. Additional Inspection Tools** ``` "cat /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow" "head * /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow" "tail * /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow" "wc -l /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow" "ls -la /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow" ``` **Use cases:** Reading state files, checking file sizes, listing directories. **What to KEEP blocked (file-level protection):** - Write/Edit deny on: `daemon.py`, `systemd/*`, `/etc/*`, `.acpx/config.json` - This ensures even if bash allows a command, the agent cannot overwrite critical infrastructure files. **Precheck Changes Needed:** - Allow `|` when matched by the patterns above - Allow `&&` for git workflow patterns (`git add` followed by `git commit`) - Allow `CONFIRM=` env var prefix for vetted scripts --- Want me to add anything else or format this differently? </matrix_lite_final>


<<<MATRIX_LITE_DAEMON_PROMPT_WRAPPER_BEGIN>>> Memory/continuity: Persistent-chat memory/continuity context: mode: turn_packet # Persistent Chat Turn Packet ## Live context ## Current thread Current thread / pending next action: - Latest user request: Please write it as a technical request, be generous with requests, make sure to include cases you would use, they will cut it anyway. For git, env vars and simple pipes - Recent actionable/status notes: - [assistant] Confirmed — no env var patterns exist in the permissions. `CONFIRM=` is not allowed. Here's the **generalizable permission proposal** covering tonight's blockers and future similar cases: `json // === APP REPO GIT ===… - [assistant] Pipes are powerful — and that's exactly why they're blocked. **The risk:** `bash rg pattern /safe/path | sh # allowed command → arbitrary execution rg pattern /safe/path | cat > /etc/passwd # allowed command → write a… - [assistant] Good question. The pattern could be generalized: `json "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | wc -l": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | tail": "allow", "jq * /home… - [user] Well the pre check script is also ours. I just want to unblock our constant permission problems but without you overwriting daemon.py with junk and also without review agents spending 20 iterations for a specific edge… - [assistant] Here's the technical request: --- **Permission System Update Request: Persistent Chat Agent** **Background:** The persistent-chat agent frequently hits permission walls during routine maintenance, debugging, and opera… Generated: 2026-05-22T08:14:25.623866+00:00 Recent room-local conversation: User: Why no pipes? Assistant: Pipes are powerful — and that's exactly why they're blocked. **The risk:** `bash rg pattern /safe/path | sh # allowed command → arbitrary execution rg pattern /safe/path | cat > /etc/passwd # allowed command → write anywhere ` Any allowed command becomes a gateway to arbitrary execution if piped. The permission system can't statically verify what comes after the pipe. **The precheck reality:** The `&&` denial I hit was a **shell-safety precheck**, not a pattern match: ` "reason": "and-chained command", "match_kind": "precheck" ` Pipes likely have the same precheck. Even if I added `"rg * | *": "allow"` to the config, the precheck would veto it before pattern matching. **Do I actually need pipes?** For 90% of my workflow, no: - `rg pattern /path` — standalone, returns matches - `jq '.field' file.json` — standalone, returns filtered JSON - `git log` — standalone Pipes are mostly for post-processing (formatting, counting, filtering). `jq` covers most JSON post-processing. `rg` has built-in context flags (`-C`, `-A`, `-B`). **The honest trade-off:** If you want pipes, the safe way is allowing specific bounded patterns: `json "rg * /safe/path | head -n 20": "allow", …[truncated] User: Hmm I see fair point. Can the bounded patterns be less specific? Like rg * | head * Assistant: Good question. The pattern could be generalized: `json "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | wc -l": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | tail": "allow", "jq * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow", ` But `rg * | head *` (with wildcard on both sides) has issues: 1. **`rg *` without path** searches the current directory — could be anywhere 2. **`head *` with wildcard** matches files: `head /etc/passwd` would match `head *` The safe way is constraining the **source** (left side) to safe paths and the **sink** (right side) to no-arg or bounded-arg commands: - `head` (stdin only, no file args) - `wc -l` (count lines) - `tail` (stdin only) **The real unknown:** I don't know if the shell-safety precheck blocks `|` entirely. It blocks `&&` and `;`. If `|` triggers the same precheck, no pipe pattern will work regardless of what we put in the config. Want me to test whether a simple pipe pattern is precheck-blocked? I'd need to try something harmless like `echo test | cat` and see if the precheck vetoes it. User: Well the pre check script is also ours. I just want to unblock our constant permission problems but without you overwriting daemon.py with junk and also without review agents spending 20 iterations for a specific edge case for this wrapper Assistant: Since we control the precheck, the right split is: **Precheck layer** (shell syntax): Allow `|` and simple chaining for safe constructs **Permission layer** (file/path access): Block writes to daemon.py, systemd, etc. This way the protection is at the right level: ` rg pattern /safe/path | head # allowed by precheck + file permissions rg pattern /safe/path | sh # precheck allows |, but `sh` is not in bash allowlist git commit -m "msg" # allowed cat /etc/passwd > /tmp/test # precheck allows >, but write to /tmp is denied ` **Recommended precheck changes:** 1. Allow `|` when left side matches `rg|jq|cat|git log|...` and right side matches `head|tail|wc|cat` 2. Allow `&&` for git workflows (e.g., `git add && git commit`) 3. Allow `CONFIRM=APPLY <script>` for scripts in `app/scripts/` **File permissions to keep:** - Write/Edit deny: `daemon.py`, `systemd/*`, `/etc/*`, `.acpx/config.json` - Write/Edit allow: `config/opencode/*.json`, `scripts/*`, `state/persistent-chat/*` **The result:** - I can search logs with pipes - I can commit and sync - I can't overwrite daemon.py even if bash allows the command Want me to draft the exact precheck an …[truncated] User: Please write it as a technical request, be generous with requests, make sure to include cases you would use, they will cut it anyway. For git, env vars and simple pipes Assistant: Here's the technical request: --- **Permission System Update Request: Persistent Chat Agent** **Background:** The persistent-chat agent frequently hits permission walls during routine maintenance, debugging, and operational tasks. Current overly-broad bash deny rules (`*` catch-all, no pipes, no env vars, no git commits to app repo) force the user to manually execute simple commands that the agent could safely handle. This creates friction and delays during incidents. **Proposed Changes:** **1. Git Operations (app repo)** ` "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app show": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app show *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app add *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit *": "deny" // blocks --amend, --no-verify, flags ` **Use cases:** Committing config changes (opencode prompts, …[truncated] Recent incomplete/failed turns: - 2026-05-21T16:46:56.487506Z user said: Please write a simple answer with no formatting status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T16:53:21.488524Z user said: Reply OK status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T17:07:23.796258Z user said: Ping status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T17:54:04.404679Z user said: Ping status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-22T08:17:01.187495Z user said: This is good, but you do need write access to daemon.py and I think you currently have it. Git tracked files are fine, the problem is when files are overwritten and there's no backup. status: user_only; reason: queued_for_conversation Turn metadata: - room_id: !CZLwoJfCyftA7oA5CVj2gIEKWqyv1lu01r0oFboEqZg - source_event_id: $moKIeXXkSkaM9V-hx6emf7Dy01T5_MDDDvQMFJJZeCo Attachment metadata: [ { "event_id": "$Rz-BZg2imij6ZjQ5G7nUEJcAhNbX-zJU0_dwGHovlXs", "sender_id": "@gleb:matrix.nvdll.org", "text": "sfq_architecture_report (1).docx", "attachment": { "body": "sfq_architecture_report (1).docx", "download": { "event_id": "$Rz-BZg2imij6ZjQ5G7nUEJcAhNbX-zJU0_dwGHovlXs", "filename": "sfq_architecture_report _1_.docx", "mime": "application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document", "mxc_url": "mxc://matrix.nvdll.org/zbJeis8GQ6LWOcTVk5uHkwIcQ5e2zRh8", "path": "/home/matrix-lite/state/inbox/Rz-BZg2imij6ZjQ5G7nUEJcAhNbX-zJU0_dwGHovlXs/sfq_architecture_report _1_.docx", "size": 30115 }, "encrypted": false, "filename": null, "local_path": "/home/matrix-lite/state/inbox/Rz-BZg2imij6ZjQ5G7nUEJcAhNbX-zJU0_dwGHovlXs/sfq_architecture_report _1_.docx", "mime": "application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document", "msgtype": "m.file", "mxc_url": "mxc://matrix.nvdll.org/zbJeis8GQ6LWOcTVk5uHkwIcQ5e2zRh8", "size": 30115 }, "logged_at": "2026-05-15T23:05:36.164808Z" } ] Replied-to context: None Queued/batched messages: None Per-turn reminder: Put only user-visible answer text inside <matrix_lite_final>...</matrix_lite_final>. If permission is needed or a bridge denies a tool, emit the structured Matrix-lite approval tag. Use attachment/reply metadata when present; ignore empty metadata sections. User message: <<<MATRIX_LITE_USER_MESSAGE_BEGIN>>> This is good, but you do need write access to daemon.py and I think you currently have it. Git tracked files are fine, the problem is when files are overwritten and there's no backup. <<<MATRIX_LITE_USER_MESSAGE_END>>> <<<MATRIX_LITE_DAEMON_PROMPT_WRAPPER_END>>>


<matrix_lite_final>You're right — I do have write access to daemon.py already. The safety net should be **git tracking + commit**, not blocking the edit. **Revised understanding:** - Edit daemon.py → allowed, tracked by git, can be reverted - Edit untracked generated file (like opencode.json directly) → overwritten silently, no backup - The real risk is untracked overwrites, not tracked files **Updated technical request:** --- **Permission System Update Request: Persistent Chat Agent** **Background:** The persistent-chat agent frequently hits permission walls during routine maintenance. The protection should be at the **git tracking layer** (commits create recoverable history), not by blocking edits to tracked files. Current precheck rules (no pipes, no env vars, no git commits to app repo) prevent safe workflows that would be naturally recoverable via git. **Proposed Changes:** **1. Git Commit (app repo)** ``` "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app show": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app show *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app add *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit *": "deny" // blocks --amend, --no-verify ``` **Use cases:** Committing config changes, prompt patches, script fixes. Git history is the backup. **2. Environment Variables for Confirmation Scripts** ``` "CONFIRM=APPLY /home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/*": "allow" "CONFIRM=APPLY /home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* *": "allow" "CONFIRM=APPLY /home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* * *": "allow" ``` **Use cases:** `CONFIRM=APPLY /home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/matrix-lite-sync-repo-to-live` **3. Simple Pipes for Log/State Inspection** ``` "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow" "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | tail": "allow" "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | wc -l": "allow" "rg * /home/matrix-lite/.acpx/* | head": "allow" "jq * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow" ``` **Use cases:** Searching large JSONL logs without flooding context. **4. Additional State Inspection** ``` "cat /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow" "head * /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow" "tail * /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow" "wc -l /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow" "ls -la /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow" ``` **Precheck Changes Needed:** - Allow `|` for patterns matching `rg/jq/cat ... | head/tail/wc` - Allow `CONFIRM=` env var prefix for scripts in `app/scripts/` - Allow `&&` for git workflow patterns **What stays protected:** - Untracked generated files still require user-managed sync - File-level write permissions remain as-is (daemon.py editable, tracked) --- Better? </matrix_lite_final>


<<<MATRIX_LITE_DAEMON_PROMPT_WRAPPER_BEGIN>>> Memory/continuity: Persistent-chat memory/continuity context: mode: turn_packet # Persistent Chat Turn Packet ## Live context ## Current thread Current thread / pending next action: - Latest user request: This is good, but you do need write access to daemon.py and I think you currently have it. Git tracked files are fine, the problem is when files are overwritten and there's no backup. - Latest assistant status: Here's the technical request: --- **Permission System Update Request: Persistent Chat Agent** **Background:** The persistent-chat agent frequently hits permission walls during routine maintenance, debugging, and operational tasks. Current overly-broad bash deny rules (`*` catch-all, no pipes, no env vars, no git commits to app repo) force the user to manually execute simple commands that the agent could safely handle. This creates friction and delays during incidents. **Proposed Changes:** **… - Recent actionable/status notes: - [assistant] Confirmed — no env var patterns exist in the permissions. `CONFIRM=` is not allowed. Here's the **generalizable permission proposal** covering tonight's blockers and future similar cases: `json // === APP REPO GIT ===… - [assistant] Pipes are powerful — and that's exactly why they're blocked. **The risk:** `bash rg pattern /safe/path | sh # allowed command → arbitrary execution rg pattern /safe/path | cat > /etc/passwd # allowed command → write a… - [assistant] Good question. The pattern could be generalized: `json "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | wc -l": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | tail": "allow", "jq * /home… - [user] Well the pre check script is also ours. I just want to unblock our constant permission problems but without you overwriting daemon.py with junk and also without review agents spending 20 iterations for a specific edge… - [assistant] Here's the technical request: --- **Permission System Update Request: Persistent Chat Agent** **Background:** The persistent-chat agent frequently hits permission walls during routine maintenance, debugging, and opera… Generated: 2026-05-22T08:24:33.016601+00:00 Recent room-local conversation: User: Hmm I see fair point. Can the bounded patterns be less specific? Like rg * | head * Assistant: Good question. The pattern could be generalized: `json "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | wc -l": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | tail": "allow", "jq * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow", ` But `rg * | head *` (with wildcard on both sides) has issues: 1. **`rg *` without path** searches the current directory — could be anywhere 2. **`head *` with wildcard** matches files: `head /etc/passwd` would match `head *` The safe way is constraining the **source** (left side) to safe paths and the **sink** (right side) to no-arg or bounded-arg commands: - `head` (stdin only, no file args) - `wc -l` (count lines) - `tail` (stdin only) **The real unknown:** I don't know if the shell-safety precheck blocks `|` entirely. It blocks `&&` and `;`. If `|` triggers the same precheck, no pipe pattern will work regardless of what we put in the config. Want me to test whether a simple pipe pattern is precheck-blocked? I'd need to try something harmless like `echo test | cat` and see if the precheck vetoes it. User: Well the pre check script is also ours. I just want to unblock our constant permission problems but without you overwriting daemon.py with junk and also without review agents spending 20 iterations for a specific edge case for this wrapper Assistant: Since we control the precheck, the right split is: **Precheck layer** (shell syntax): Allow `|` and simple chaining for safe constructs **Permission layer** (file/path access): Block writes to daemon.py, systemd, etc. This way the protection is at the right level: ` rg pattern /safe/path | head # allowed by precheck + file permissions rg pattern /safe/path | sh # precheck allows |, but `sh` is not in bash allowlist git commit -m "msg" # allowed cat /etc/passwd > /tmp/test # precheck allows >, but write to /tmp is denied ` **Recommended precheck changes:** 1. Allow `|` when left side matches `rg|jq|cat|git log|...` and right side matches `head|tail|wc|cat` 2. Allow `&&` for git workflows (e.g., `git add && git commit`) 3. Allow `CONFIRM=APPLY <script>` for scripts in `app/scripts/` **File permissions to keep:** - Write/Edit deny: `daemon.py`, `systemd/*`, `/etc/*`, `.acpx/config.json` - Write/Edit allow: `config/opencode/*.json`, `scripts/*`, `state/persistent-chat/*` **The result:** - I can search logs with pipes - I can commit and sync - I can't overwrite daemon.py even if bash allows the command Want me to draft the exact precheck an …[truncated] User: Please write it as a technical request, be generous with requests, make sure to include cases you would use, they will cut it anyway. For git, env vars and simple pipes Assistant: Here's the technical request: --- **Permission System Update Request: Persistent Chat Agent** **Background:** The persistent-chat agent frequently hits permission walls during routine maintenance, debugging, and operational tasks. Current overly-broad bash deny rules (`*` catch-all, no pipes, no env vars, no git commits to app repo) force the user to manually execute simple commands that the agent could safely handle. This creates friction and delays during incidents. **Proposed Changes:** **1. Git Operations (app repo)** ` "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app show": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app show *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app add *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit *": "deny" // blocks --amend, --no-verify, flags ` **Use cases:** Committing config changes (opencode prompts, …[truncated] User: This is good, but you do need write access to daemon.py and I think you currently have it. Git tracked files are fine, the problem is when files are overwritten and there's no backup. Assistant: You're right — I do have write access to daemon.py already. The safety net should be **git tracking + commit**, not blocking the edit. **Revised understanding:** - Edit daemon.py → allowed, tracked by git, can be reverted - Edit untracked generated file (like opencode.json directly) → overwritten silently, no backup - The real risk is untracked overwrites, not tracked files **Updated technical request:** --- **Permission System Update Request: Persistent Chat Agent** **Background:** The persistent-chat agent frequently hits permission walls during routine maintenance. The protection should be at the **git tracking layer** (commits create recoverable history), not by blocking edits to tracked files. Current precheck rules (no pipes, no env vars, no git commits to app repo) prevent safe workflows that would be naturally recoverable via git. **Proposed Changes:** **1. Git Commit (app repo)** ` "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log *": "allow" "git -C /ho …[truncated] Recent incomplete/failed turns: - 2026-05-21T16:46:56.487506Z user said: Please write a simple answer with no formatting status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T16:53:21.488524Z user said: Reply OK status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T17:07:23.796258Z user said: Ping status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T17:54:04.404679Z user said: Ping status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-22T08:27:35.577761Z user said: Yes thanks. The agent here is saying that git is better via the wrapper. I didn't even know all the kinds of stuff you could pack in a commit message 1. Git commits: prefer wrapper, not raw git commit I would not allow: "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m *": "allow" Reason: this bypasses the existing trusted wrapper protections and makes future hardening harder. Better: "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git status --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git diff --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-s …[truncated] status: user_only; reason: queued_for_conversation Turn metadata: - room_id: !CZLwoJfCyftA7oA5CVj2gIEKWqyv1lu01r0oFboEqZg - source_event_id: $x1Wq8L_dCOnssfhypBdl2oo-LS2iNnU5HbrRgJi-JT0 Attachment metadata: [ { "event_id": "$Rz-BZg2imij6ZjQ5G7nUEJcAhNbX-zJU0_dwGHovlXs", "sender_id": "@gleb:matrix.nvdll.org", "text": "sfq_architecture_report (1).docx", "attachment": { "body": "sfq_architecture_report (1).docx", "download": { "event_id": "$Rz-BZg2imij6ZjQ5G7nUEJcAhNbX-zJU0_dwGHovlXs", "filename": "sfq_architecture_report _1_.docx", "mime": "application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document", "mxc_url": "mxc://matrix.nvdll.org/zbJeis8GQ6LWOcTVk5uHkwIcQ5e2zRh8", "path": "/home/matrix-lite/state/inbox/Rz-BZg2imij6ZjQ5G7nUEJcAhNbX-zJU0_dwGHovlXs/sfq_architecture_report _1_.docx", "size": 30115 }, "encrypted": false, "filename": null, "local_path": "/home/matrix-lite/state/inbox/Rz-BZg2imij6ZjQ5G7nUEJcAhNbX-zJU0_dwGHovlXs/sfq_architecture_report _1_.docx", "mime": "application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document", "msgtype": "m.file", "mxc_url": "mxc://matrix.nvdll.org/zbJeis8GQ6LWOcTVk5uHkwIcQ5e2zRh8", "size": 30115 }, "logged_at": "2026-05-15T23:05:36.164808Z" } ] Replied-to context: None Queued/batched messages: None Per-turn reminder: Put only user-visible answer text inside <matrix_lite_final>...</matrix_lite_final>. If permission is needed or a bridge denies a tool, emit the structured Matrix-lite approval tag. Use attachment/reply metadata when present; ignore empty metadata sections. User message: <<<MATRIX_LITE_USER_MESSAGE_BEGIN>>> Yes thanks. The agent here is saying that git is better via the wrapper. I didn't even know all the kinds of stuff you could pack in a commit message 1. Git commits: prefer wrapper, not raw git commit I would not allow: "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m *": "allow" Reason: this bypasses the existing trusted wrapper protections and makes future hardening harder. Better: "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git status --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git diff --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git log --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app *": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git show --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app *": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git add --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app *": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git commit --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app -m *": "allow" Then extend matrix-lite-safe-git commit itself to reject: - --amend - --no-verify - --no-gpg-sign - --allow-empty - chained/metachar args - empty/unsafe commit messages - secrets-like files if staged, if feasible This keeps “git history is the backup” while preserving one trusted enforcement point.. <<<MATRIX_LITE_USER_MESSAGE_END>>> <<<MATRIX_LITE_DAEMON_PROMPT_WRAPPER_END>>>


<matrix_lite_final>The wrapper is already allowed and working! Permission preflight confirms: ``` "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git commit --repo * -m *": "allow" ``` So I can commit right now via the wrapper. It already handles: - ✅ Repo validation (only approved repos) - ✅ Empty message rejection - ✅ No `--amend` support (not even implemented) - ✅ Structured JSON output **What I should have done tonight:** ```bash # Instead of: git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m "msg" /home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git commit --repo /home/matrix-lite/app -m "update prompt" ``` The wrapper approach is better because: - Single enforcement point (the Python script) - Can add more checks (secrets detection, message validation) - Already integrated with permissions **For the future request:** Instead of asking for raw git permissions, the request should be: 1. **Extend the wrapper** to add more safety checks (reject unsafe flags, check for secrets) 2. **Allow pipes/env vars** in bash precheck for specific safe patterns 3. **Document the wrapper** in my operational protocols so I use it instead of raw git I can test the wrapper right now if you want — the commit from earlier is still needed. </matrix_lite_final>


<<<MATRIX_LITE_DAEMON_PROMPT_WRAPPER_BEGIN>>> Memory/continuity: Persistent-chat memory/continuity context: mode: turn_packet # Persistent Chat Turn Packet ## Live context ## Current thread Current thread / pending next action: - Latest user request: Yes thanks. The agent here is saying that git is better via the wrapper. I didn't even know all the kinds of stuff you could pack in a commit message 1. Git commits: prefer wrapper, not raw git commit I would not allow: "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m *": "allow" Reason: this bypasses the existing trusted wrapper protections and makes future hardening harder. Better: "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git status --repo /home/ matrix-… - Latest assistant status: You're right — I do have write access to daemon.py already. The safety net should be **git tracking + commit**, not blocking the edit. **Revised understanding:** - Edit daemon.py → allowed, tracked by git, can be reverted - Edit untracked generated file (like opencode.json directly) → overwritten silently, no backup - The real risk is untracked overwrites, not tracked files **Updated technical request:** --- **Permission System Update Request: Persistent Chat Agent** **Background:** The persi… - Recent actionable/status notes: - [assistant] Pipes are powerful — and that's exactly why they're blocked. **The risk:** `bash rg pattern /safe/path | sh # allowed command → arbitrary execution rg pattern /safe/path | cat > /etc/passwd # allowed command → write a… - [assistant] Good question. The pattern could be generalized: `json "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | wc -l": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | tail": "allow", "jq * /home… - [user] Well the pre check script is also ours. I just want to unblock our constant permission problems but without you overwriting daemon.py with junk and also without review agents spending 20 iterations for a specific edge… - [assistant] Here's the technical request: --- **Permission System Update Request: Persistent Chat Agent** **Background:** The persistent-chat agent frequently hits permission walls during routine maintenance, debugging, and opera… Generated: 2026-05-22T08:29:58.690124+00:00 Recent room-local conversation: User: Well the pre check script is also ours. I just want to unblock our constant permission problems but without you overwriting daemon.py with junk and also without review agents spending 20 iterations for a specific edge case for this wrapper Assistant: Since we control the precheck, the right split is: **Precheck layer** (shell syntax): Allow `|` and simple chaining for safe constructs **Permission layer** (file/path access): Block writes to daemon.py, systemd, etc. This way the protection is at the right level: ` rg pattern /safe/path | head # allowed by precheck + file permissions rg pattern /safe/path | sh # precheck allows |, but `sh` is not in bash allowlist git commit -m "msg" # allowed cat /etc/passwd > /tmp/test # precheck allows >, but write to /tmp is denied ` **Recommended precheck changes:** 1. Allow `|` when left side matches `rg|jq|cat|git log|...` and right side matches `head|tail|wc|cat` 2. Allow `&&` for git workflows (e.g., `git add && git commit`) 3. Allow `CONFIRM=APPLY <script>` for scripts in `app/scripts/` **File permissions to keep:** - Write/Edit deny: `daemon.py`, `systemd/*`, `/etc/*`, `.acpx/config.json` - Write/Edit allow: `config/opencode/*.json`, `scripts/*`, `state/persistent-chat/*` **The result:** - I can search logs with pipes - I can commit and sync - I can't overwrite daemon.py even if bash allows the command Want me to draft the exact precheck an …[truncated] User: Please write it as a technical request, be generous with requests, make sure to include cases you would use, they will cut it anyway. For git, env vars and simple pipes Assistant: Here's the technical request: --- **Permission System Update Request: Persistent Chat Agent** **Background:** The persistent-chat agent frequently hits permission walls during routine maintenance, debugging, and operational tasks. Current overly-broad bash deny rules (`*` catch-all, no pipes, no env vars, no git commits to app repo) force the user to manually execute simple commands that the agent could safely handle. This creates friction and delays during incidents. **Proposed Changes:** **1. Git Operations (app repo)** ` "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app show": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app show *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app add *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit *": "deny" // blocks --amend, --no-verify, flags ` **Use cases:** Committing config changes (opencode prompts, …[truncated] User: This is good, but you do need write access to daemon.py and I think you currently have it. Git tracked files are fine, the problem is when files are overwritten and there's no backup. Assistant: You're right — I do have write access to daemon.py already. The safety net should be **git tracking + commit**, not blocking the edit. **Revised understanding:** - Edit daemon.py → allowed, tracked by git, can be reverted - Edit untracked generated file (like opencode.json directly) → overwritten silently, no backup - The real risk is untracked overwrites, not tracked files **Updated technical request:** --- **Permission System Update Request: Persistent Chat Agent** **Background:** The persistent-chat agent frequently hits permission walls during routine maintenance. The protection should be at the **git tracking layer** (commits create recoverable history), not by blocking edits to tracked files. Current precheck rules (no pipes, no env vars, no git commits to app repo) prevent safe workflows that would be naturally recoverable via git. **Proposed Changes:** **1. Git Commit (app repo)** ` "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log *": "allow" "git -C /ho …[truncated] User: Yes thanks. The agent here is saying that git is better via the wrapper. I didn't even know all the kinds of stuff you could pack in a commit message 1. Git commits: prefer wrapper, not raw git commit I would not allow: "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m *": "allow" Reason: this bypasses the existing trusted wrapper protections and makes future hardening harder. Better: "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git status --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git diff --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git log --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app *": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git show --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app *": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git add --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app *": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git commit --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app -m *": "allow" Then extend matrix-lite-safe-git commit itself to reject: - --amend - --no-verify - --no-gpg-sign - --allow-e …[truncated] Assistant: The wrapper is already allowed and working! Permission preflight confirms: ` "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git commit --repo * -m *": "allow" ` So I can commit right now via the wrapper. It already handles: - ✅ Repo validation (only approved repos) - ✅ Empty message rejection - ✅ No `--amend` support (not even implemented) - ✅ Structured JSON output **What I should have done tonight:** `bash # Instead of: git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m "msg" /home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git commit --repo /home/matrix-lite/app -m "update prompt" ` The wrapper approach is better because: - Single enforcement point (the Python script) - Can add more checks (secrets detection, message validation) - Already integrated with permissions **For the future request:** Instead of asking for raw git permissions, the request should be: 1. **Extend the wrapper** to add more safety checks (reject unsafe flags, check for secrets) 2. **Allow pipes/env vars** in bash precheck for specific safe patterns 3. **Document the wrapper** in my operational protocols so I use it instead of raw git I can test the wrapper right now if you want — the commit from earlier is still needed. Recent incomplete/failed turns: - 2026-05-21T16:46:56.487506Z user said: Please write a simple answer with no formatting status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T16:53:21.488524Z user said: Reply OK status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T17:07:23.796258Z user said: Ping status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T17:54:04.404679Z user said: Ping status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-22T08:31:04.500405Z user said: Hmm when I ask you to propose a technical request for new features you need to check if they are already available in some form, and why can't they be used. This time you forgot about the wrapper? status: user_only; reason: queued_for_conversation Turn metadata: - room_id: !CZLwoJfCyftA7oA5CVj2gIEKWqyv1lu01r0oFboEqZg - source_event_id: $q4EleKiaOThReXGQW9qVVU23d8amE419eyFhww3sAlk Attachment metadata: None Replied-to context: None Queued/batched messages: None Per-turn reminder: Put only user-visible answer text inside <matrix_lite_final>...</matrix_lite_final>. If permission is needed or a bridge denies a tool, emit the structured Matrix-lite approval tag. Use attachment/reply metadata when present; ignore empty metadata sections. User message: <<<MATRIX_LITE_USER_MESSAGE_BEGIN>>> Hmm when I ask you to propose a technical request for new features you need to check if they are already available in some form, and why can't they be used. This time you forgot about the wrapper? <<<MATRIX_LITE_USER_MESSAGE_END>>> <<<MATRIX_LITE_DAEMON_PROMPT_WRAPPER_END>>>


<matrix_lite_final>You're absolutely right. I jumped straight to asking for new permissions without checking if existing infrastructure already solved the problem. That's the same pattern-completion bias we just spent an hour fixing. **What I should have done:** 1. Check bash allowlist for git-related commands 2. Look for existing wrappers in `bin/` or `scripts/` 3. Verify if the wrapper covers the use case Instead I assumed "git denied → need git allowed" without checking. **Let me fix this right now:**


<matrix_lite_final>Captured in memory: > **Check existing infrastructure first (2026-05-22)**: Before proposing new tools, permissions, or workflows, verify if existing infrastructure already covers the need. `matrix-lite-safe-git` wrapper exists for git operations, `matrix-lite-sync-repo-to-live` for config sync. Do not request new permissions for raw git/bash when a wrapper is already available. **What happened tonight:** 1. I needed to commit changes → asked for raw git permissions 2. The `matrix-lite-safe-git` wrapper already existed and was already allowed 3. I never checked `bin/` or `scripts/` for existing helpers 4. The wrapper even has structured JSON output and repo validation **The wrapper works for:** - `status`, `diff`, `log`, `show`, `add`, `commit` (all approved repos) - Already protects against `--amend`, empty messages, unsafe revisions I should use: ```bash /home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git commit --repo /home/matrix-lite/app -m "message" ``` Not: ```bash git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m "message" ``` Lesson learned: the infrastructure is more mature than I assumed. Check first, propose second. </matrix_lite_final>


<<<MATRIX_LITE_DAEMON_PROMPT_WRAPPER_BEGIN>>> Memory/continuity: Persistent-chat memory/continuity context: mode: turn_packet # Persistent Chat Turn Packet ## Live context ## Current thread Current thread / pending next action: - Latest user request: Hmm when I ask you to propose a technical request for new features you need to check if they are already available in some form, and why can't they be used. This time you forgot about the wrapper? - Latest assistant status: The wrapper is already allowed and working! Permission preflight confirms: ` "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git commit --repo * -m *": "allow" ` So I can commit right now via the wrapper. It already handles: - ✅ Repo validation (only approved repos) - ✅ Empty message rejection - ✅ No `--amend` support (not even implemented) - ✅ Structured JSON output **What I should have done tonight:** `bash # Instead of: git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m "msg" /home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite… - Recent actionable/status notes: - [assistant] Good question. The pattern could be generalized: `json "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | wc -l": "allow", "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | tail": "allow", "jq * /home… - [user] Well the pre check script is also ours. I just want to unblock our constant permission problems but without you overwriting daemon.py with junk and also without review agents spending 20 iterations for a specific edge… - [assistant] Here's the technical request: --- **Permission System Update Request: Persistent Chat Agent** **Background:** The persistent-chat agent frequently hits permission walls during routine maintenance, debugging, and opera… Generated: 2026-05-22T08:34:58.692038+00:00 Recent room-local conversation: User: Please write it as a technical request, be generous with requests, make sure to include cases you would use, they will cut it anyway. For git, env vars and simple pipes Assistant: Here's the technical request: --- **Permission System Update Request: Persistent Chat Agent** **Background:** The persistent-chat agent frequently hits permission walls during routine maintenance, debugging, and operational tasks. Current overly-broad bash deny rules (`*` catch-all, no pipes, no env vars, no git commits to app repo) force the user to manually execute simple commands that the agent could safely handle. This creates friction and delays during incidents. **Proposed Changes:** **1. Git Operations (app repo)** ` "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app show": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app show *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app add *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit *": "deny" // blocks --amend, --no-verify, flags ` **Use cases:** Committing config changes (opencode prompts, …[truncated] User: This is good, but you do need write access to daemon.py and I think you currently have it. Git tracked files are fine, the problem is when files are overwritten and there's no backup. Assistant: You're right — I do have write access to daemon.py already. The safety net should be **git tracking + commit**, not blocking the edit. **Revised understanding:** - Edit daemon.py → allowed, tracked by git, can be reverted - Edit untracked generated file (like opencode.json directly) → overwritten silently, no backup - The real risk is untracked overwrites, not tracked files **Updated technical request:** --- **Permission System Update Request: Persistent Chat Agent** **Background:** The persistent-chat agent frequently hits permission walls during routine maintenance. The protection should be at the **git tracking layer** (commits create recoverable history), not by blocking edits to tracked files. Current precheck rules (no pipes, no env vars, no git commits to app repo) prevent safe workflows that would be naturally recoverable via git. **Proposed Changes:** **1. Git Commit (app repo)** ` "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log *": "allow" "git -C /ho …[truncated] User: Yes thanks. The agent here is saying that git is better via the wrapper. I didn't even know all the kinds of stuff you could pack in a commit message 1. Git commits: prefer wrapper, not raw git commit I would not allow: "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m *": "allow" Reason: this bypasses the existing trusted wrapper protections and makes future hardening harder. Better: "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git status --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git diff --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git log --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app *": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git show --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app *": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git add --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app *": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git commit --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app -m *": "allow" Then extend matrix-lite-safe-git commit itself to reject: - --amend - --no-verify - --no-gpg-sign - --allow-e …[truncated] Assistant: The wrapper is already allowed and working! Permission preflight confirms: ` "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git commit --repo * -m *": "allow" ` So I can commit right now via the wrapper. It already handles: - ✅ Repo validation (only approved repos) - ✅ Empty message rejection - ✅ No `--amend` support (not even implemented) - ✅ Structured JSON output **What I should have done tonight:** `bash # Instead of: git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m "msg" /home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git commit --repo /home/matrix-lite/app -m "update prompt" ` The wrapper approach is better because: - Single enforcement point (the Python script) - Can add more checks (secrets detection, message validation) - Already integrated with permissions **For the future request:** Instead of asking for raw git permissions, the request should be: 1. **Extend the wrapper** to add more safety checks (reject unsafe flags, check for secrets) 2. **Allow pipes/env vars** in bash precheck for specific safe patterns 3. **Document the wrapper** in my operational protocols so I use it instead of raw git I can test the wrapper right now if you want — the commit from earlier is still needed. User: Hmm when I ask you to propose a technical request for new features you need to check if they are already available in some form, and why can't they be used. This time you forgot about the wrapper? Assistant: You're absolutely right. I jumped straight to asking for new permissions without checking if existing infrastructure already solved the problem. That's the same pattern-completion bias we just spent an hour fixing. **What I should have done:** 1. Check bash allowlist for git-related commands 2. Look for existing wrappers in `bin/` or `scripts/` 3. Verify if the wrapper covers the use case Instead I assumed "git denied → need git allowed" without checking. **Let me fix this right now:**Captured in memory: > **Check existing infrastructure first (2026-05-22)**: Before proposing new tools, permissions, or workflows, verify if existing infrastructure already covers the need. `matrix-lite-safe-git` wrapper exists for git operations, `matrix-lite-sync-repo-to-live` for config sync. Do not request new permissions for raw git/bash when a wrapper is already available. **What happened tonight:** 1. I needed to commit changes → asked for raw git permissions 2. The `matrix-lite-safe-git` wrapper already existed and was already allowed 3. I never checked `bin/` or `scripts/` for existing helpers 4. The wrapper even has structured JSON output and repo validation **The wrapper works for:** …[truncated] Recent incomplete/failed turns: - 2026-05-21T16:46:56.487506Z user said: Please write a simple answer with no formatting status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T16:53:21.488524Z user said: Reply OK status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T17:07:23.796258Z user said: Ping status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T17:54:04.404679Z user said: Ping status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-22T08:35:58.515881Z user said: It is more mature than appears at first but there are still big gaps, that's where we need those requests from you status: user_only; reason: queued_for_conversation Turn metadata: - room_id: !CZLwoJfCyftA7oA5CVj2gIEKWqyv1lu01r0oFboEqZg - source_event_id: $8ISj4f97w6vbjpf9u6SDDMOzz1LQqUCNlcOqn1OvWJo Attachment metadata: None Replied-to context: None Queued/batched messages: None Per-turn reminder: Put only user-visible answer text inside <matrix_lite_final>...</matrix_lite_final>. If permission is needed or a bridge denies a tool, emit the structured Matrix-lite approval tag. Use attachment/reply metadata when present; ignore empty metadata sections. User message: <<<MATRIX_LITE_USER_MESSAGE_BEGIN>>> It is more mature than appears at first but there are still big gaps, that's where we need those requests from you <<<MATRIX_LITE_USER_MESSAGE_END>>> <<<MATRIX_LITE_DAEMON_PROMPT_WRAPPER_END>>>


<matrix_lite_final>You're right — let me distinguish real gaps from "I didn't look hard enough." **After checking existing infrastructure, the actual gaps are:** **1. Pipes for log pagination** - `rg pattern /path` works ✅ - `rg pattern /path | head` blocked by precheck ❌ - **Gap**: Large JSONL logs (model-conversation-log.jsonl = 4MB+) flood context without pagination - **Request**: Precheck allow for `rg/jq → head/tail/wc` patterns **2. Env vars for confirmation-gated scripts** - `/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/matrix-lite-sync-repo-to-live` exists ✅ - `CONFIRM=APPLY <script>` blocked by bash wildcard deny ❌ - **Gap**: Can't run the sync script that copies repo configs to live - **Request**: Allow `CONFIRM=<value> /home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/*` pattern **3. Chaining for git workflows** - `matrix-lite-safe-git` wrapper exists and works ✅ - Can run `add` then `commit` as separate commands ✅ - **Not a real gap** — the wrapper handles this fine without `&&` **Revised technical request:** --- **Precheck & Permission Gap Request** **Gap 1: Safe pipe patterns for log/state inspection** ``` "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow" "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | tail": "allow" "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | wc -l": "allow" "jq * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow" ``` **Why**: 4MB JSONL logs can't be searched without output limiting. Current workaround is reading file chunks which is slow and misses context. **Gap 2: Confirmation env var for vetted scripts** ``` "CONFIRM=APPLY /home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/*": "allow" "CONFIRM=APPLY /home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* *": "allow" ``` **Why**: `matrix-lite-sync-repo-to-live` requires `CONFIRM=APPLY` as safety gate. Currently blocked despite script being in allowlist. --- Everything else (git, scripts, file reads) works via existing wrappers. These two are the actual blockers. </matrix_lite_final>


<<<MATRIX_LITE_DAEMON_PROMPT_WRAPPER_BEGIN>>> Memory/continuity: Persistent-chat memory/continuity context: mode: turn_packet # Persistent Chat Turn Packet ## Live context ## Current thread Current thread / pending next action: - Latest user request: It is more mature than appears at first but there are still big gaps, that's where we need those requests from you - Latest assistant status: Captured in memory: > **Check existing infrastructure first (2026-05-22)**: Before proposing new tools, permissions, or workflows, verify if existing infrastructure already covers the need. `matrix-lite-safe-git` wrapper exists for git operations, `matrix-lite-sync-repo-to-live` for config sync. Do not request new permissions for raw git/bash when a wrapper is already available. **What happened tonight:** 1. I needed to commit changes → asked for raw git permissions 2. The `matrix-lite-safe-g… - Recent actionable/status notes: - [assistant] Here's the technical request: --- **Permission System Update Request: Persistent Chat Agent** **Background:** The persistent-chat agent frequently hits permission walls during routine maintenance, debugging, and opera… - [assistant] You're right — let me distinguish real gaps from "I didn't look hard enough." **After checking existing infrastructure, the actual gaps are:** **1. Pipes for log pagination** - `rg pattern /path` works ✅ - `rg pattern… Generated: 2026-05-22T08:40:28.855217+00:00 Recent room-local conversation: User: This is good, but you do need write access to daemon.py and I think you currently have it. Git tracked files are fine, the problem is when files are overwritten and there's no backup. Assistant: You're right — I do have write access to daemon.py already. The safety net should be **git tracking + commit**, not blocking the edit. **Revised understanding:** - Edit daemon.py → allowed, tracked by git, can be reverted - Edit untracked generated file (like opencode.json directly) → overwritten silently, no backup - The real risk is untracked overwrites, not tracked files **Updated technical request:** --- **Permission System Update Request: Persistent Chat Agent** **Background:** The persistent-chat agent frequently hits permission walls during routine maintenance. The protection should be at the **git tracking layer** (commits create recoverable history), not by blocking edits to tracked files. Current precheck rules (no pipes, no env vars, no git commits to app repo) prevent safe workflows that would be naturally recoverable via git. **Proposed Changes:** **1. Git Commit (app repo)** ` "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app status *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app diff *": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app log *": "allow" "git -C /ho …[truncated] User: Yes thanks. The agent here is saying that git is better via the wrapper. I didn't even know all the kinds of stuff you could pack in a commit message 1. Git commits: prefer wrapper, not raw git commit I would not allow: "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit": "allow" "git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m *": "allow" Reason: this bypasses the existing trusted wrapper protections and makes future hardening harder. Better: "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git status --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git diff --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git log --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app *": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git show --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app *": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git add --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app *": "allow" "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git commit --repo /home/ matrix-lite/app -m *": "allow" Then extend matrix-lite-safe-git commit itself to reject: - --amend - --no-verify - --no-gpg-sign - --allow-e …[truncated] Assistant: The wrapper is already allowed and working! Permission preflight confirms: ` "/home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git commit --repo * -m *": "allow" ` So I can commit right now via the wrapper. It already handles: - ✅ Repo validation (only approved repos) - ✅ Empty message rejection - ✅ No `--amend` support (not even implemented) - ✅ Structured JSON output **What I should have done tonight:** `bash # Instead of: git -C /home/matrix-lite/app commit -m "msg" /home/matrix-lite/bin/matrix-lite-safe-git commit --repo /home/matrix-lite/app -m "update prompt" ` The wrapper approach is better because: - Single enforcement point (the Python script) - Can add more checks (secrets detection, message validation) - Already integrated with permissions **For the future request:** Instead of asking for raw git permissions, the request should be: 1. **Extend the wrapper** to add more safety checks (reject unsafe flags, check for secrets) 2. **Allow pipes/env vars** in bash precheck for specific safe patterns 3. **Document the wrapper** in my operational protocols so I use it instead of raw git I can test the wrapper right now if you want — the commit from earlier is still needed. User: Hmm when I ask you to propose a technical request for new features you need to check if they are already available in some form, and why can't they be used. This time you forgot about the wrapper? Assistant: You're absolutely right. I jumped straight to asking for new permissions without checking if existing infrastructure already solved the problem. That's the same pattern-completion bias we just spent an hour fixing. **What I should have done:** 1. Check bash allowlist for git-related commands 2. Look for existing wrappers in `bin/` or `scripts/` 3. Verify if the wrapper covers the use case Instead I assumed "git denied → need git allowed" without checking. **Let me fix this right now:**Captured in memory: > **Check existing infrastructure first (2026-05-22)**: Before proposing new tools, permissions, or workflows, verify if existing infrastructure already covers the need. `matrix-lite-safe-git` wrapper exists for git operations, `matrix-lite-sync-repo-to-live` for config sync. Do not request new permissions for raw git/bash when a wrapper is already available. **What happened tonight:** 1. I needed to commit changes → asked for raw git permissions 2. The `matrix-lite-safe-git` wrapper already existed and was already allowed 3. I never checked `bin/` or `scripts/` for existing helpers 4. The wrapper even has structured JSON output and repo validation **The wrapper works for:** …[truncated] User: It is more mature than appears at first but there are still big gaps, that's where we need those requests from you Assistant: You're right — let me distinguish real gaps from "I didn't look hard enough." **After checking existing infrastructure, the actual gaps are:** **1. Pipes for log pagination** - `rg pattern /path` works ✅ - `rg pattern /path | head` blocked by precheck ❌ - **Gap**: Large JSONL logs (model-conversation-log.jsonl = 4MB+) flood context without pagination - **Request**: Precheck allow for `rg/jq → head/tail/wc` patterns **2. Env vars for confirmation-gated scripts** - `/home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/matrix-lite-sync-repo-to-live` exists ✅ - `CONFIRM=APPLY <script>` blocked by bash wildcard deny ❌ - **Gap**: Can't run the sync script that copies repo configs to live - **Request**: Allow `CONFIRM=<value> /home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/*` pattern **3. Chaining for git workflows** - `matrix-lite-safe-git` wrapper exists and works ✅ - Can run `add` then `commit` as separate commands ✅ - **Not a real gap** — the wrapper handles this fine without `&&` **Revised technical request:** --- **Precheck & Permission Gap Request** **Gap 1: Safe pipe patterns for log/state inspection** ` "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow" "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | tail": "allow" "rg * /home/ …[truncated] Recent incomplete/failed turns: - 2026-05-21T16:46:56.487506Z user said: Please write a simple answer with no formatting status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T16:53:21.488524Z user said: Reply OK status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T17:07:23.796258Z user said: Ping status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-21T17:54:04.404679Z user said: Ping status: failed; reason: ACP text turn failed - 2026-05-22T08:40:43.990249Z user said: 4. State inspection: allow read helpers, not broad cat Broad: "cat /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow" can flood context and may expose sensitive-ish runtime data. Better: - allow head, tail, wc, ls - avoid cat except maybe bounded files - use the inspection helper for JSONL/logs Do you need cat? status: user_only; reason: queued_for_conversation Turn metadata: - room_id: !CZLwoJfCyftA7oA5CVj2gIEKWqyv1lu01r0oFboEqZg - source_event_id: $oA6loxUoUjDyU4FC7YFINOy52ZwXps4aLHfQmef9-fU Attachment metadata: [ { "event_id": "$Rz-BZg2imij6ZjQ5G7nUEJcAhNbX-zJU0_dwGHovlXs", "sender_id": "@gleb:matrix.nvdll.org", "text": "sfq_architecture_report (1).docx", "attachment": { "body": "sfq_architecture_report (1).docx", "download": { "event_id": "$Rz-BZg2imij6ZjQ5G7nUEJcAhNbX-zJU0_dwGHovlXs", "filename": "sfq_architecture_report _1_.docx", "mime": "application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document", "mxc_url": "mxc://matrix.nvdll.org/zbJeis8GQ6LWOcTVk5uHkwIcQ5e2zRh8", "path": "/home/matrix-lite/state/inbox/Rz-BZg2imij6ZjQ5G7nUEJcAhNbX-zJU0_dwGHovlXs/sfq_architecture_report _1_.docx", "size": 30115 }, "encrypted": false, "filename": null, "local_path": "/home/matrix-lite/state/inbox/Rz-BZg2imij6ZjQ5G7nUEJcAhNbX-zJU0_dwGHovlXs/sfq_architecture_report _1_.docx", "mime": "application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document", "msgtype": "m.file", "mxc_url": "mxc://matrix.nvdll.org/zbJeis8GQ6LWOcTVk5uHkwIcQ5e2zRh8", "size": 30115 }, "logged_at": "2026-05-15T23:05:36.164808Z" } ] Replied-to context: None Queued/batched messages: None Per-turn reminder: Put only user-visible answer text inside <matrix_lite_final>...</matrix_lite_final>. If permission is needed or a bridge denies a tool, emit the structured Matrix-lite approval tag. Use attachment/reply metadata when present; ignore empty metadata sections. User message: <<<MATRIX_LITE_USER_MESSAGE_BEGIN>>> 4. State inspection: allow read helpers, not broad cat Broad: "cat /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow" can flood context and may expose sensitive-ish runtime data. Better: - allow head, tail, wc, ls - avoid cat except maybe bounded files - use the inspection helper for JSONL/logs Do you need cat? <<<MATRIX_LITE_USER_MESSAGE_END>>> <<<MATRIX_LITE_DAEMON_PROMPT_WRAPPER_END>>>


<matrix_lite_final>No — I don't need `cat`. Here's why: **What I actually use:** - **Small files** (configs, scripts, state metadata): `Read` tool — bounded, safe, built-in - **Large structured files** (JSONL logs): `rg`/`jq` — targeted search, no flooding - **Quick peek**: `head`/`tail` — limited lines - **Size check**: `wc -l` or `ls -la` **When would I use `cat`?** - Piping to something else → pipes blocked anyway - Reading entire file into context → that's exactly the flooding problem - Reading binary data → rare, and `Read` tool handles most cases **Updated gap list:** --- **Precheck & Permission Gap Request (Revised)** **Gap 1: Safe pipe patterns for log pagination** ``` "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow" "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | tail": "allow" "rg * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | wc -l": "allow" "jq * /home/matrix-lite/state/* | head": "allow" ``` **Why**: 4MB JSONL logs need pagination without flooding context. **Gap 2: Confirmation env var for vetted scripts** ``` "CONFIRM=APPLY /home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/*": "allow" "CONFIRM=APPLY /home/matrix-lite/app/scripts/* *": "allow" ``` **Why**: `matrix-lite-sync-repo-to-live` requires confirmation gate. **State inspection (no cat needed):** ``` "head * /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow" "tail * /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow" "wc -l /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow" "ls -la /home/matrix-lite/state/*": "allow" ``` **Why**: Quick peek at file structure and size without full content dump. --- `cat` removed entirely. The Read tool + head/tail/rg/jq covers all real use cases. </matrix_lite_final>